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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the district court err in finding a violation of RCRA §
3008(d)(3) because Omni's telephone call was not a report
used for purposes of compliance with regulations promul-
gated by the EPA, the facts omitted were not material,
appellant Barker lacked the necessary mens rea, and the
district court's interpretation of the statutory provision
was inconsistent with the statute's plain language and con-
gressional intent?
II. Did the district court err in convicting Barker as a corpo-
rate officer where RCRA does not impose the responsible
corporate officer doctrine, where Barker did not bear a
responsible share of the conduct alleged to have violated
RCRA and where compelling policy arguments require
limiting the government's discretion to prosecute in this
case?
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BRIEF FOR BERNARD BARKER, Appellant
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Untied States District Court for the
District of New Union is unreported.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a jury trial before the United States District Court
for the District of New Union, appellant Bernard Barker and
Charles Canner were convicted of violating § 3008(d)(3) of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 42 U.S.C.
6928(d)(3) (1983 & Supp. 1990). Their subsequent motions for
judgment of acquittal were denied. R.7. Section 3008(d)(3)
imposes criminal penalties upon any person who "knowingly
omits material information or makes any false material state-
ment or representation in any application, label, manifest,
record, report or other document" that must be used to com-
ply with regulations promulgated by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) under the Hazardous Waste Manage-
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ment Program. Appellants face a fine, imprisonment or both.
Id.
Barker and Canner were convicted on the basis of a tele-
phone conversation between one of Canner's employees, Mr.
Arnold Adams, and an EPA inspector. Mr. Barker is the gen-
eral manager of Omni Manufacturing's New Union City man-
ufacturing plant. He is sixty-four years old, a veteran, and two
years from retirement. He is responsible for running all as-
pects of Omni's plant. He supervises 400 plant employees and
reports directly to Omni president and founder, Mr. Canner.
The responsibilities of the Omni plant manager include envi-
ronmental compliance. R.3. Omni manufactures hypercom-
puters, and employs 1200 people in the New Union City area.
DWE, a hazardous waste as defined under RCRA, is a by-
product of Omni's manufacturing activities.
On June 29 and 30, 1989, the EPA regional office in New
Union City received several citizen complaints about strong
chemical odors emitting from a location outside the Omni
plant. R.3. EPA inspector Diane Durden visited the site and
found a discolored patch of ground with a strong chemical
odor adjacent to the road and near the main gate of the Omni
plant. R.2. Inspector Durden took a soil sample and had it
tested at the EPA laboratory. The test revealed that the soil
was contaminated with DWE. R.3.
Following the determination that the chemical odor and
contaminated ground was the result of a release of DWE, In-
spector Durden began an investigation into the source of the
chemical. On August 2, 1989, Durden wrote a letter to Omni
explaining that DWE had been detected outside the gate of
the Omni plant and inquiring whether Omni "kn[e]w its
source." R.3.
Upon receiving Durden's written inquiry Mr. Barker con-
ferred with Mr. Adams, the Omni Manufacturing facilities
manager for the New Union City Plant. R.4. Adams was re-
sponsible for all maintenance and waste disposal at Omni.
R.2. Adams told Barker that although Omni had serviced one
of its trucks for a leak on June 28, 1990, no driver had re-
ported any actual leakage. In addition, Adams told Barker
that Omni had shipped DWE to a nearby recycler in late
[Vol. 8
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June. He also said he was unable to determine whether the
DWE had been transported in the leaking truck. R.4.
Inspector Durden's written inquiry arrived more than a
month after the leaking truck had been serviced and did not
include the date the spill occurred. Because other manufactur-
ers transport DWE past the Omni plant, Adams and Barker
were unable to determine with any certainty whether Omni
was the source of the DWE. R.4. Adams and Barker next dis-
cussed what action should be taken in response to Inspector
Durden's written inquiry and they concluded that Adams
should telephone the EPA. Barker advised Adams to be truth-
ful and to follow the letter of the law. R.4.
On August 9, 1990, Adams spoke with Inspector Durden
on the telephone regarding Durden's letter of August 2, 1990.
Adams told Durden that Omni did not know the source of the
DWE spill and that EPA was welcome to visit the Omni facil-
ity. R.4. Following her conversation with Adams, she typed a
memorandum of the conversation and placed it in her file. She
did not pursue the investigation further.
Inspector Durden later learned that the DWE detected
outside the Omni facility had leaked from an Omni truck. On
August 16, 1990, New Union City police officer Egger told her
that he had seen an Omni truck leaking yellow liquid as it sat
stopped at the roadside near the Omni gate on June 26, 1990.
R.4. Based upon the new information given to EPA by officer
Egger, Durden called Adams at Omni Manufacturing on Au-
gust 17, 1990. R.4. Adams told Durden that a truck had been
serviced for a leak on or about the date Egger saw the spill.
He once again invited Durden to visit Omni Manufacturing
for the purpose of investigating the spill. Once the date of the
spill was established, Durden and Adams determined that the
DWE had originated at the Omni facility. The records showed
that Omni had transported DWE on June 26, 1990, and that
it was transported in the leaking truck. R.5. Interviews with
the service crew confirmed this and the crew reported noticing
a yellow residue on the truck's underbody. R.5. With their as-
sistance, Inspector Durden took samples of the residue. It was
tested and found to contain traces of DWE. R.5.
1991]
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At trial, appellants argued that the prosecution had not
proven that Omni had made any "false" statements and that
section 3008(d)(3) did not apply to Omni's telephone call. Sec-
tion 3008(d)(3) only applies to written documents used to
comply with regulations promulgated under Subchapter III of
RCRA. Appellants alternatively argued that if section
3008(d)(3) controls, neither Canner nor Barker possessed the
mens rea to sustain a conviction. The district court rejected
these arguments and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. R.7.
Appellants then motioned for a judgment of acquittal, pursu-
ant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On September 14, 1990, their motions were denied and this
appeal followed. R.7.
Appellant's appeal raises two issues: first, whether the
government proved a violation of section 3008; and second,
whether, under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, Mr.
Barker should have been held responsible for the actions of
Mr. Adams.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bernard Barker should not have been found criminally li-
able for the telephone call made by Arnold Adams because
Mr. Adams' conduct did not violate § 3008(d)(3). The govern-
ment cannot establish three critical elements which must be
present in order for Omni's conduct to constitute a violation:
one, that Omni filed a "report;" two, that the information in
the report was "material;" and three, that the violation was
made "knowingly."
The district court erred in finding that Mr. Adam's tele-
phone call was a "report." Congress intended the term "re-
port" to apply only to written documents. Such a report must
be used for the purpose of compliance with EPA regulations.
EPA regulations refer to three types of report, all written.
The telephone call is not such a report.
The district court also erred in finding that the informa-
tion omitted from the telephone call was "material." A state-
ment is material if it is capable of influencing or affecting a
governmental function. Withholding the fact that an Omni
[Vol. 8
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truck had been repaired for a leak an entire month prior to
the government's request for information was not intended to,
nor should it have, dissuaded the government from pursuing
its investigation.
Regarding the third element, the requisite mens rea, the
district court erred in finding that the government satisfied
this element. Under well settled principles of criminal law, as
well as under the Model Penal Code, the district court was
required to find that Mr. Barker had "knowledge" that the
telephone call was a "report" and that the information omit-
ted was "material." Because Barker did not have the requisite
knowledge, because the telephone call was not a report, and
because the information omitted from the call was not mate-
rial, the district court erred in finding that the government
had proven a violation of § 3008(d)(3).
This conclusion is supported by the fact that Congress in-
tended the EPA, not corporations like Omni, to perform in-
vestigations of any suspected violations of RCRA. In addition,
the criminal conviction of Barker does not fulfill the statutory
purposes underlying § 3008(d)(3). Therefore, the district court
erred in convicting Barker.
In addition, Barker should not have been convicted under
the theory that he was responsible for the conduct alleged to
have violated § 3008 based upon his position in the corpora-
tion. Congress did not intend for the responsible officer doc-
trine to apply to the criminal liability provisions of RCRA.
This is clear from its omission of any language invoking the
doctrine. Further, even if the doctrine did apply, the district
court applied the incorrect standard. Barker must bear a re-
sponsible share of the conduct alleged to have violated the
statute. Barker did not bear a responsible share. The district
court erroneously convicted him solely because of his position
within the corporation.
The criminal sanctions imposed on Mr. Barker far out-
weigh any potential harm from the alleged violation. The gov-
ernment should limit it prosecutions to those cases where the
corporate officer's conduct results in serious harm to the envi-
ronment. None of the policies underlying RCRA support the
conviction of Mr. Barker., There are several significant equita-
1991]
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ble arguments for overturning his conviction. For these rea-
sons, the judgment of the district court of New Union, deny-
ing Mr. Barker's motion for acquittal, should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A VIOLA-
TION OF RCRA § 3008(d)(3) BECAUSE OMNI'S COM-
MUNICATION WITH THE EPA WAS NOT A RE-
PORT, THE FACTS OMITTED WERE NOT
MATERIAL, APPELLANT BARKER LACKED THE
NECESSARY MENS REA, AND THE DISTRICT
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF § 3008(d)(3) IS IN-
CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTE'S PLAIN LAN-
GUAGE AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
was enacted in 1976, in part to provide a regulatory frame-
work for the disposal of hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et
seq. (1983 & Supp. 1990). The framework chosen by Congress
was a manifest system designed to track hazardous waste from
its "cradle," point of generation, to its "grave," place of dispo-
sal. In order to ensure compliance with RCRA's Hazardous
Waste Management Program, Congress included criminal pro-
visions for, among other things, the knowing omission of ma-
terial information from a report filed for purposes of compli-
ance with regulations promulgated under the program. 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
While the overall purpose of RCRA is to protect the envi-
ronment and public welfare, the purpose of the criminal sanc-
tions is to ensure the integrity of the manifest system, to en-
courage hazardous waste handlers to cooperate with the EPA
when the agency undertakes an investigation, and to deter
them from ignoring the statute's requirements in order to gain
an economic advantage in the marketplace. See Habicht, The
Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforce-
ment: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 ELR 10478, 10482
(1987) [hereinafter Habicht, The Federal Perspective]. Under
the scheme envisioned by Congress, the EPA is responsible
for enforcing the program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6912(c), 6916(e), 6927,
[Vol. 8
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6928. The EPA must prove three elements to establish a vio-
lation of 3008(d)(3): (1) it must show that the communication
in question is a report used for purposes of compliance with
regulations promulgated under the Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Program, (2) it must show that omitted information was
material, and (3) it must show that the omission was made
knowingly.
The district court's decision was premised upon a misin-
terpretation of the statute. Because appellant challenges the
district court's interpretation of RCRA, not its findings of
fact, review is plenary. The conclusions of law drawn by the
court below "are not shielded by any presumption of correct-
ness." Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C. A. Hughes & Company,
669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981). When the statute is examined
closely, it is evident that the district court erred in finding
that a violation of RCRA was proven, and its decision, deny-
ing appellant Barker's motion for judgment of acquittal,
should be reversed.
A. Omni's Telephone Call to the EPA was not a Report
Filed for Purposes of Compliance with Regulations
Promulgated by the EPA Under Subchapter III of
RCRA.
The telephone call to the EPA, made on Omni's behalf by
Mr. Adams, was not a report for purposes of compliance with
regulations promulgated under RCRA's Hazardous Waste
Management Program (Subchapter III). The language of
3008(d)(3) clearly indicates Congress's intent to limit its ap-
plication to written documents. The statute provides criminal
sanctions for the omission of a material fact from an "applica-
tion, label, manifest, record, report, permit, or other docu-
ment." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). Under the canon of statutory
construction known as noscitur a sociis, an ambiguity arising
from the use of a general term in a statute can be resolved by
reference to associated terms. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Con-
struction, § 47.16 (4th ed. 1984). When the statute contains a
list of terms having a similar meaning, as it does here, the
general word, "report," is limited and qualified by the special
1991]
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word, "document." Id. The term "document" clearly implies
written material, not oral communication. The provision's
other terms, "application," "label," "manifest," "record," and
"permit," refer to written documents. When the term "report"
is considered in context, and by reference to associated terms,
it is clear that Congress intended to limit the application of §
3008(d)(3) to written documents.
Not only must a report be written before it comes under
the scope of RCRA's criminal provisions, it must also be made
"for purposes of compliance with regulations promulgated by
the [EPA]... under [Subchapter III]." 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3).
The district court blithely overlooked this statutory require-
ment as "too fine a point," (R. 5), in reaching its decision. It is
an elementary rule of construction that "[a] statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant...
" 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.06. Nowhere
in the district court's opinion is there any reference to a regu-
lation promulgated under Subchapter III.
The documents specifically mentioned in Subchapter III
are all part of RCRA's manifest system. The EPA has gener-
ated regulations that give industry notice of exactly what in-
formation these documents must contain and how they are to
be kept. The terms "application" and "permit" are found in §
3005, which creates standards governing owners and operators
of hazardous waste disposal sites. 42 U.S.C. § 6925. The terms
"manifest," "label," "record," and "report" are all found in §§
3002 and 3003. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6923. The term "manifest"
is found in §§ 3002(a)(5) and 3003(a)(3). The term "label" is
found in § 3002(a)(2). Reference to the term "record" is found
in §§ 3002(a)(1) and 3003(a)(1). The regulations that tell in-
dustry exactly what information must be included in these
documents and how they should be maintained are found in
EPA Standards Applicable To Generators Of Hazardous
Waste, 40 CFR § 262.10 et seq.(1989).
The term "report" is found in § 3002(a)(6), which calls
for submission of reports to the EPA biennially, detailing
quantities and nature of hazardous wastes generated and ef-
forts by the generator to reduce the volume and toxicity of its
[Vol. 8
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waste. 42 U.S.C. § 6922. EPA regulations governing such a re-
port are found in Part 262, Subpart D, titled Recordkeeping
and Reporting. 40 CFR § 262.40 et seq. These regulations re-
fer to written documents. They detail the type of information
the documents must contain and how the documents should
be identified. These regulations cover three'types of reports,
biennial reports, § 262.41, exception reports, § 262.42, and ad-
ditional reports, § 262.43. The biennial report regulations of-
fer specific guidelines that assist industry in complying with
the requirements imposed upon it under § 3002. These regula-
tions are extremely detailed, directing industry to include,
among other things, its EPA identification number, the EPA
hazardous waste number, and a signed certification. The regu-
lations tell industry when the report must be submitted and
how many copies must be sent. Similarly detailed regulations
exist for exception and additional reports.
The regulations specifically refer to three types of reports
and it is clear that this is what both Congress intended, and
the EPA understood, to be the scope of the term "report" as
it is used in § 3008(d)(3). Where Congress and an agency have
given a term a particular meaning it should always be con-
strued in a manner consistent with that meaning. Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). It is clear that the criminal
provisions of § 3008 refer to these terms, not generally as the
district court believed, but specifically as Congress used them
in Subchapter III. Therefore the telephone call does not fall
within the scope of RCRA's false statements provision.
The only other reference to report found in the sub-
chapter is in § 3007. There is a presumption that identical
words used twice in the same act have the same meaning. At-
lantic Cleaners and Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433
(1932). Section 3007 does not require a hazardous waste han-
dler to make a report to the EPA. It only requires that they
make any report required under § 3002 available to the EPA
upon request. The letter from the EPA was not a request for
such a report.
This interpretation is consistent with the primary regula-
tory purpose of the statute, preservation of the record's integ-
rity. RCRA is premised upon the integrity of its manifest sys-
1991]
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tern. The duty of a hazardous waste generator or transporter
is to maintain a record of all the hazardous waste for which it
is responsible. The criminal sanctions were provided to deter
industry from altering or deleting information from this rec-
ord. Habicht, The Federal Perspective, 17 ELR at 10482. The
generator or transporter is to maintain the record and make it
available to the EPA upon request. 42 U.S.C. § 6927. Omni's
telephone call was not part of the manifest system. The state-
ment was not presented as a summation of all relevant evi-
dence to be found in Omni's files. It was merely a conclusion,
drawn by Mr. Adams after reviewing Omni's records, that
there was no conclusive evidence establishing Omni's respon-
sibility for the spill. Most importantly, at no time did Omni
ever attempt to remove pertinent information from its files or
alter any documents. The record was left intact and was avail-
able to the EPA for examination. The purpose of the criminal
provisions was served and no justification exists for the impo-
sition of criminal penalties.
Under Subchapter III the EPA has promulgated regula-
tions establishing clear guidelines for industry compliance.
Where a generator or transporter has failed to observe these
clear guidelines the imposition of criminal sanctions is appro-
priate. However, when, as in the case before the bar, the infor-
mation request from the EPA contains no guidelines that es-
tablish the range of information necessary to satisfy the
request, Congress clearly did not intend to make such a deter-
mination subject to criminal penalties.
While this issue, exactly what type of communication is
subject to the criminal provisions, has not been the subject of
litigation under RCRA, it has arisen in the enforcement of a
related provision under the Clean Water Act. United States v.
Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). Section 309 of
the Clean Water Act imposes criminal sanctions for false
statements made in a report filed under the Act. 33 U.S.C.
1319(c)(4) (1986 & Supp. 1990). In Olin the corporate defend-
ant was charged with violation of § 309(c)(4) of the Clean
Water Act. The court found that Olin could not be charged
with violation of the Clean Water Act because it did not have
any specific duty to file or maintain the report in question. Id.
[Vol. 8
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at 1131. The court ruled that where the defendant had no ob-
ligation to file the report and the EPA had not compelled it to
file the report the defendant was not subject to the sanctions
imposed by § 309(c)(4). "Section [309] only applies when the
Administrator finds that a violation of a permit condition or
of a particular section of the Act has occurred." Id. This hold-
ing is consistent with Omni's position that criminal sanctions
are only to be imposed where a defendant has failed to com-
ply with the established regulatory guidelines of the Act, or in
other words, where EPA has given the defendant notice of
what is required.
EPA has not connected Mr. Adams' phone call to any
specific section of RCRA. The EPA has not established a spe-
cific duty on the part of Omni to file the report. As in Olin, no
violation of the Act has been proven.
In Olin, the corporate defendant was found guilty of vio-
lating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. This statute punishes anyone who
"knowingly and willfully" makes a false statement to a federal
agency. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976 & Supp. 1990). This catchall
prohibition would probably cover Omni's telephone call, if it
were found to be false. Congress required that the government
show a higher mens rea in order to convict a defendant under
§ 1001 than under RCRA's § 3008. Under § 3008 the govern-
ment must only show that a defendant acted "knowingly." 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). This is because § 1001 encompasses com-
munications made to the federal government which are volun-
tary and where no regulatory guidelines, detailing what is re-
quired of the defendant, exist. In Olin, the filing of the
document was not required and there were no guidelines for
compliance. Olin, 465 F. Supp. at 1131. The lower mens rea
requirement reflects the fact that a hazardous waste handler
is subject to extensive regulations which explicitly guide its
conduct. This is why Congress included in § 3008 the lan-
guage, "for purposes of compliance with regulations promul-
gated by the [EPA]," thereby restricting imposition of crimi-
nal penalties to situations in which the defendant ignores
clearly established guidelines. Bernard Barker had no guide-
lines to use in complying with EPA's request for information.
The district court erred in construing Omni's telephone
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call as a report because a report must be a written document
and must be one of the three types of report described in
EPA's regulations. Therefore, the District Court's decision, in
which it denied Mr. Barker's motion for judgment of acquit-
tal, should be reversed.
B. The Information Omitted From Omni's Phone Call
to the EPA was not Material.
In order for there to be a violation of § 3008(d)(3), the
information omitted from Omni's phone call to EPA must
have been material. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). A statement is
material if "it is capable of influencing or affecting a govern-
mental function." Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. at 1132. The dis-
trict court's determination of materiality is subject to com-
plete review on appeal and is not controlled by the clearly
erroneous standard. United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d
1148, 1151 (6th Cir. 1985). When we apply this standard to
facts in the instant case it is clear that the information omit-
ted from Omni's phone call was not material and there was no
violation of § 3008(d)(3).
The EPA obviously suspected that the source of the
DWE was the Omni plant. The spill occurred directly in front
of the plant and the substance spilled was a byproduct of
Omni's manufacturing process. The information available to
Omni at the time was, however, insufficient to support a con-
clusive determination that the DWE found along the road
came from the Omni plant. Had Omni included the fact that
an Omni truck had been repaired over a month before the
EPA contacted Omni, that information would have at best en-
abled the EPA to conclude that Omni was the most probable
source of the DWE. Omni would have remained the EPA's
prime suspect with or without the inclusion of this informa-
tion in the phone call.
Furthermore, Omni received the EPA's letter on August
2, 1989. The letter gave no indication of when the spill oc-
curred. It was not unreasonable for Omni to conclude that the
spill was promptly reported. The fact that one of the trucks
was repaired more than a month before the EPA's letter ar-
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rived was immaterial. If the EPA had asked Omni if it knew
of a DWE spill that occurred sometime in early July, the in-
formation about the leaking truck would clearly have been
material. The EPA's failure to include the date of the spill in
its letter led to Omni's determination that the information
omitted was immaterial. The EPA, not Omni, was the party
that omitted material information.
Omni's determination of materiality should be viewed in
light of the facts available to Omni at the time. The discovery
of conclusive evidence linking Omni to the spill several weeks
later and outside of Omni's records has the effect of making
its decision seem unreasonable. At the time Omni made its
decision, it was perfectly reasonable to conclude that the
omitted information was immaterial.
Omni's statement to the effect that Omni was unaware of
the source of the DWE was not only true, it was not intended,
nor could it realistically have been expected to, dissuade the
EPA from continuing to consider the Omni plant as its prime
suspect. Omni's statement should not have influenced or af-
fected a governmental function. Omni remained the EPA's
prime suspect. The EPA indicated in its letter that it was con-
ducting an investigation. This information was available to
the EPA at any time, had they attempted to conduct a rea-
sonable investigation.
The district court's determination of materiality is sub-
ject to plenary review. Chandler, 752 F.2d at 1151. From the
circumstances surrounding Omni's decision to omit the infor-
mation from its phone call, it is evident that information
omitted was not material, because it did not influence or af-
fect a governmental function. The district court erred in find-
ing that EPA had proven a violation of RCRA § 3008(d)(3).
Therefore the district court's decision, in which it denied Mr.
Barker's motion for judgment of acquittal, should be reversed.
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C. The District Court's Conclusion That Mr. Barker
Acted Knowingly Is Inconsistent With The Plain
Language of RCRA Section 3008(d)(3) And Well Es-
tablished Principles of Criminal Law.
The state of mind for all criminal violations under § 3008
is "knowing." A joint conference committee of the 96th Con-
gress reported that "[t]he conferees have not sought to define
'knowing' for offenses under subsection (d); that process has
been left to the courts under general principles." House Con-
ference Report No. 96-1444, 96th Cong. 2d sess. reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, pp. 5019 - 5038, 5028.
Therefore any prosecution under RCRA § 3008(d)(3) must be
consistent with well established principles of criminal law. Mr.
Barker argues that he did not possess the requisite mens rea
to sustain a conviction under RCRA § 3008(d). Section
3008(d)(3) imposes criminal penalties only upon a person who
"knowingly" omits material information in a "report" or other
document filed for purposes of compliance with regulations
promulgated under RCRA. Mr. Barker asserts that the term
"knowingly" requires that defendants under § 3008(d)(3)
must have knowledge that information is "material" and that
they must have knowledge that they are submitting a "report"
before they may be convicted of omitting "material informa-
tion" from a "report" within the meaning of § 3008(d)(3).
Opinions issued by the United States Supreme Court and
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, as well as the lan-
guage of the Model Penal Code, support Mr. Barker's con-
struction of the term "knowingly."
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed itself to
§ 3008(d), it is well settled that "legal terms in a statute are
presumed to have been used in their legal sense. . . ." 2A
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 47.30 (4th ed. 1984).
The term "knowingly" is a familiar expression of one level of
mens rea necessary to sustain a conviction for certain types of
criminal conduct. When used in a criminal statute, the mean-
ing of this language is well established.
The Supreme Court has defined what is meant when the
term "knowingly" is used in a statute. As the term plainly
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suggests, a defendant must act with knowledge that certain
relevant factual circumstances exist before he may be found
to have acted "knowingly" in a given context.
In the case of Boyce Motor Lines Inc. v. United States,
the Supreme Court decided whether a statute which pro-
scribed "knowingly" violating regulations under 18 U.S.C. §
834, pertaining to the safe transportation of dangerous arti-
cles, was unconstitutionally vague. 342 U.S. 337 (1952). The
Court reasoned that the statute "only punishes those who
knowingly violate the regulation. This requirement of the
presence of culpable intent [i]s a necessary element of the of-
fense... [i]t must be shown that petitioner knew that there
was a practicable, safer route and yet deliberately took the
more dangerous route. . . ." 342 U.S. at 342-243. Thus, the
Court construed the term "knowingly" to require that a de-
fendant act with knowledge that certain circumstances existed
at the time of the conduct in question, namely, whether there
was a safer route by which to transport the hazardous materi-
als regulated under the statute.
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971), construed the term "knowingly" in
the same manner as Boyce Motor Lines. The International
Minerals Court was called upon to construe the term "know-
ingly" used in 18 U.S.C. § 834 and determine whether a de-
fendant must act with knowledge of "the facts" rendering his
or her activity within the regulations at issue or whether a de-
fendant must know of the "pertinent law" as prerequisite to
conviction for "knowingly violat[ing] any such regulation." Id.
at 559. The Court found that Congress' use of the term
"knowingly" explicitly required that a defendant act with
knowledge of the relevant facts before he or she may be con-
victed under the statute. The Court found that "strict liability
is not imposed: knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous
materials is required." International Minerals at 560.
Application of Boyce Motor Lines and International
Minerals to the instant case reveals that the term "know-
ingly" requires that defendants such as Mr. Barker act with
the knowledge that certain circumstances exist before they
may be convicted for "knowingly" engaging in conduct pro-
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scribed under § 3008(d)(3). Thus, in the case at bar, RCRA §
3008(d)(3) requires that Mr. Barker be proven to have acted
with knowledge that omitted information was "material" and
that he was filing a "report" to the EPA. 42 U.S.C 6928(d)(3).
Because Barker did not have this knowledge, the district court
erred in finding him criminally liable.
Unlike Appellee in International Minerals, Mr.Barker
does not argue that he must be shown to have had knowledge
of the pertinent law under which the activities of Omni are
regulated, rather, he argues that he did not have knowledge
that the information in question was "material" or that he
was filing a "report" within the meaning of RCRA §
3008(d)(3). The Model Penal Code is helpful to illustrate and
emphasize that Mr Barker's construction of § 3008(d)(3) is
correct. The Supreme Court has stated that "the ALI Model
Penal Code is one source of guidance upon which the Court
has relied to illuminate questions of this type." United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978).
The term "knowingly" is one of four culpable states of
mind utilized by the American Law Institute in § 2.02 of the
Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code provides that "a
person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of
an offense when. . .the element involves the nature of his
conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his
conduct is of that nature of or that such circumstances exist..
. ." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commen-
taries, § 2.02, (1985). The commentaries to § 2.02 state that
"[a] person acts 'knowingly' with respect to a result if it is not
his conscious objective, yet he is practically certain that his
conduct will cause the result." Id.
Application of the Model Penal Code to the instant case
yields the same result as application of the principles declared
by the Supreme Court in Boyce Motor Lines and Interna-
tional Minerals. In order to support a conviction under RCRA
§ 3008(d)(3) Mr. Barker must be proven to have had known
that the omitted information was "material" and that he was
making a "report." Expressed differently, Mr. Barker must
have been "practically certain" that his conduct would result
in the omission of "material information" from a "report."
[16]
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Mr. Barker could not have possessed, nor has the Government
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Barker had such
knowledge or certainty.
Omni received the EPA's written inquiry on August 2. In-
spector Durden's letter gave no indication of when the spill
occurred. Thus, it was not unreasonable of Omni to conclude
that the spill was promptly reported and the fact that one of
the trucks was repaired more than a month before the EPA's
letter arrived was not material. The EPA's failure to include
the approximate date of the spill led Omni to this determina-
tion. At the time Omni made its decision it was perfectly rea-
sonable to conclude that the omitted information was not
material.
In addition, as is set out above, the term "report" in
RCRA § 3008(d)(3) does not include an informal telephone
conversation in response to a vague request for information.
Mr. Barker did not act with knowledge of the factual circum-
stances which would render his conduct criminal. The district
court ignored this point and based its decision upon a misin-
terpretation of the statute. The judgment of the District
Court should be reversed and Mr. Barker's motion for acquit-
tal granted.
Mr. Barker's construction of § 3008(d)(3) is entirely con-
sistent with existing precedent. Three federal circuits have
agreed that the term "knowingly" as used throughout §
3008(d) requires that a defendant act with knowledge that
certain relevant circumstances exist before he or she may be
convicted under that provision.
In United States v. Hoflin, the ninth circuit held that
"the government must prove, and the jury must be instructed,
that the defendant knew the material being disposed of was
hazardous" in order to sustain a conviction under RCRA §
3008(d)(2)(A), 880 F.2d 1033, 1039, (9th Cir. 1989). The third
circuit reached a similar conclusion regarding the same provi-
sion in the case of United States v. Johnson & Towers, 741
F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
Although the reasoning of the Johnson & Towers court was
expressly rejected by the Hoflin court, the decisions agree in
construction of the term "knowingly." Like the Hoflin court,
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the third circuit concluded that "the term 'knowingly' which
introduces subsection (A), must also encompass knowledge
that the waste material is hazardous." Johnson & Towers, 741
F.2d at 668.
In a similar case, the eleventh circuit found under RCRA
§ 3008(d)(1) that "in this regulatory context a defendant acts
'knowingly' if he willfully fails to determine the permit status
of the facility." United States v. Hayes International Corp.,
786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986). The Hayes court further
elaborated that "a defendant acts knowingly if he is aware
'that the result is practically certain to follow from his con-
duct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.'" Id. See
also, United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1979), Model
Penal Code § 2.02.
The construction of § 3008(d)(3) urged by Mr. Barker is
also supported by interpretations of similar provisions of
other environmental statutes. United States v. Corbin Farm
Service, 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd 576 F.2d 259
(9th Cir. 1978) (The term "knowingly" used in § 1361tb) of
the Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act requires that
knowledge be proved in order to establish a violation), United
States v. Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd
703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983)
(To sustain a conviction under § 301 of the Clean Water Act
is necessary to show that defendants intended to do the acts
for which they were convicted). United States v. Oulette, 15
ELR 20899 (E.D. Ark. 1977) (The term "knowingly" used in §
309(c)(4) of the Clean Water Act requires that the govern-
ment prove that the defendant made false statements with
knowledge that the statements were indeed false).
The facts of the instant case are insufficient to support a
finding that Mr. Barker acted with the necessary level of in-
tent to support a conviction under § 3008(d)(3). Appellant
Barker could not have been "practically certain" that the
omitted information was "material" within the meaning of §
3008(d)(3). EPA's initial request for information was not suffi-
ciently detailed to provide Barker with the facts necessary to
make such a determination. Omni had no basis on which to
draw the inferences necessary to conclude that the omitted in-
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formation was "material." Appellant challenges the district
court's interpretation of "knowing," a conclusion of law, and
therefore review is plenary. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C. A.
Hughes & Company, 669 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1981). The govern-
ment has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Barker's "knowingly" omitted material information from a
"report" filed for purposes of compliance with regulations
promulgated under RCRA's Subchapter III.
D. The District Court Erred In Construing RCRA's
Criminal Provisions in a Manner that Fails to Effec-
tuate the Statute's Regulatory Purpose and Frus-
trates the Intent of Congress.
Although RCRA is remedial in nature and generally given
a liberal construction it is not appropriate to give such a con-
struction to its penal provisions. The appropriate standard for
interpreting criminal sanctions contained in a remedial stat-
ute is to construe the provisions so as best to effectuate the
regulatory purpose of the statute. United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984).
The regulatory purpose of RCRA's criminal provisions is
to ensure that adequate records are kept by those who handle
hazardous waste, to encourage industry to cooperate with the
EPA, and to prevent industry from violating the statute in
order to obtain an advantage in the marketplace. Habicht,
The Federal Perspective, 17 ELR at 10482. The court below
failed to refer to any of the criminal sanctions' purposes in
finding that a violation occurred. In fact, no such relationship
can be established given the facts of this case.
As already noted, Omni made no attempt to alter, or de-
lete information from, the record. The information was availa-
ble to the EPA at all times. The integrity of the record was
never imperiled. In the telephone call, Omni's willingness to
cooperate was emphasized and when additional evidence came
to light, Omni invited the EPA inspector to the plant to in-
spect its records and interview Omni's driver and service crew.
No attempt was made to influence the investigation in any
way. As a matter of fact, Omni employees assisted the inspec-
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tor by elevating the truck so she could take samples of the
material seen on its underbody. No effort had been made by
Omni to remove this physical evidence. Imposing criminal
sanctions after receiving such cooperation is unjust. If Mr.
Barker is to be held liable for Mr. Adams' telephone call he
should also be given credit for the willingness to cooperate
Mr. Adams later displayed.
No significant economic advantage was sought by Omni
in omitting the information from its telephone call. The cost
of cleaning up a spill the size of the one in question is minor
when compared with Omni's operating budget.
The action taken by Omni did not threaten the integrity
of the manifest system, display a reluctance to cooperate with
an EPA investigation, nor was it taken in order to gain an
economic advantage in the marketplace. The district court's
interpretation of RCRA § 3008, and its subsequent imposition
of criminal penalties on Mr. Barker does not serve any of the
statute's purposes and may very well discourage Omni and
other corporations from cooperating as willingly in the future.
The district court's interpretation of § 3008(d)(3) frus-
trates legislative intent by imposing a self investigative duty
on industry. A statute should not be given an interpretation
that leads to absurd results or frustrates legislative intent.
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486-87 (1868).
Congress clearly intended that EPA enforce RCRA's statutory
requirements. Congress gave the EPA the money, manpower,
and authority to conduct investigations of any suspected vio-
lation of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6912(c), 6916(e), 6927, 6928. It is
clear that Congress intended the EPA to do more than it did
here. A vague unartfully framed request for information does
not fulfill the EPA's investigative duty. EPA did nothing
more than mail out some letters, a full month after the spill
was reported, and then "kept a file open." (R.4). The EPA
failed to timely instruct the police force on how to report
spills and failed to ask the local police if they had any knowl-
edge of the spill, coming upon this information entirely by
chance. Finally, the agency failed to take the most obvious
step in a reasonable investigation of the reported spill, a pre-
liminary investigation of the records of the plant which pro-
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duced the waste product in question, and outside whose door
the spill occurred. Instead the agency attempted to foist its
statutory duties upon the corporate defendant. The statute
cannot support the district court's imposition of this self in-
vestigative duty on industry.
The court below erred in interpreting RCRA's criminal
provisions broadly without making any inquiry as to RCRA's
regulatory purpose. The court stretched the statutory mean-
ing of the terms "knowing," "report," and "material," beyond
their limits and ignored the statutory requirement that the re-
port be "for purpose of compliance with regulations." When
the statute is read carefully, its regulatory purposes and legis-
lative intent considered, it is clear that there was no violation
of RCRA § 3008(d)(3). Therefore the district court's decision,
in which it denied Mr. Barker's motion for judgment of ac-
quittal, should be reversed.
II. THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT THE DISTRICT
COURT ERRED IN FINDING BARKER CRIMI-
NALLY LIABLE WHERE THE RESPONSIBLE COR-
PORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY,
WHERE BARKER DID NOT BEAR A RESPONSIBLE
SHARE OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION AND
WHERE COMPELLING POLICY ARGUMENTS RE-
QUIRE LIMITING THE GOVERNMENT'S
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION.
As plant manager of Omni, Bernard Barker is responsible
for the daily operation of a manufacturing firm which employs
four hundred people. Part of Barker's duties include waste
disposal. One issue before the court is whether these facts
alone are enough to convict Barker for an action, taken by any
of those four hundred employees, which violates federal waste
disposal law.
Spurred by growing public concern for the environment,
the government has responded by significantly increasing the
number of criminal prosecutions brought under environmen-
tal statutes. These criminal prosecutions are an immediate
and effective tool for deterring environmental crime. However,
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as with all powerful tools, criminal prosecutions are subject to
abuse. The government must be restrained in its ability to
prosecute or corporate employees will be convicted for actions
which pose little or no threat to the environment and where
their responsibility is arguable.
Congress has recognized this fact. So, while popular senti-
ment might support the imposition of criminal sanctions for
seemingly technical violations of federal environmental stat-
utes and regulations, the law provides otherwise. Congress ex-
ercised restraint by refusing to incorporate the responsible
corporate officer doctrine into RCRA. Under RCRA, the
courts must find that a person has done more than accept a
position as a corporate officer to convict them of an environ-
mental crime. In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that
a jury cannot be instructed to convict a person based solely
upon that person's position in a corporation. United States v.
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975). The actions which resulted in
the conviction of Bernard Barker were beyond his ability to
control or prevent. When viewed objectively, the facts do not
support the imposition of criminal sanctions on Mr. Barker.
A. Congress Limited the Scope of Section 3008 by Nar-
rowing the Definition of "Person" to Exclude the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine.
Among the environmental statutes which include criminal
sanctions, RCRA stands apart as the only one which does not
specifically incorporate the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15). Congress intended to base crimi-
nal liability under RCRA on more than a person's position in
a corporation. A comparison of RCRA to several environmen-
tal statutes highlights this intent. Section 309(c)(6) of the
Clean Water Act specifically states that the definition of "per-
son" includes "any responsible corporate officer." 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(3). The Clean Air Act includes an identical provision
in § 113(c)(3). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1990).
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act in-
cludes language which specifically makes the "acts of officers"
subject to its criminal provisions. 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(4) (1981
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& Supp. 1989).
These acts were passed before RCRA; Congress was
aware of these acts and used them as guidance while drafting
the language of RCRA. For example, the citizen suit provi-
sions in the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and RCRA
are virtually identical. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7604;
and 42 U.S.C. § 6972. A common method of statutory inter-
pretation is to read similar statutes together or "in pari
materia," especially where the statutes were enacted with a
common purpose. See e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978). By omitting any provision explicitly incorporating the
responsible corporate officer doctrine, Congress expressed its
intention to limit criminal liability. But c.f., Johnson & Tow-
ers, 741 F.2d at 665.
Further, had Congress so desired, it had ample opportu-
nity to amend RCRA to include language incorporating the
responsible corporate officer doctrine when it passed the 1984
Hazardous and Solid Waste Act amendments to RCRA. Con-
gress did not expand the scope of the criminal provisions to
cover the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Legislative ac-
tion by amendment of a statute may indicate approval of un-
affected portions of the law. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Con-
struction, § 49.10. This rule of construction is especially
appropriate given the rapid increase in the number of crimi-
nal prosecutions of corporate officials during the early 1980's.
Congress was aware of this trend and deliberately decided not
to impose criminal liability on persons based solely on their
position within a corporation.
Therefore, the district court erred in applying the respon-
sible corporate officer doctrine. The standard of criminal lia-
bility under § 3008(d)(3) is whether Barker "knowingly" made
any false statement. This court should reverse Barker's con-
viction because it was based upon the wrong standard.
B. Under the Standard of United States v. Park,
Barker can not be Convicted Based Solely Upon His
Position in the Corporation.
Even if the responsible corporate officer doctrine should
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be applied, the district court did not correctly apply the doc-
trine. The most recent decision by the Supreme Court dis-
cussing the responsible corporate officer doctrine is Park. 421
U.S. 658. In Park, the Supreme Court upheld a jury instruc-
tion regarding the criminal liability of a corporate president
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
They upheld the instructions because the "charge did not per-
mit the jury to find guilt solely on the basis of respondent's
position in the corporation." Id. at 674. Instead, the judge
properly instructed the jury to determine whether the corpo-
rate agent bore a "responsible relationship" to or had a "re-
sponsible share" of any violations. Id. at 672.
The statute in this case sets out an even more stringent
standard. RCRA requires proof of knowledge as a requisite el-
ement for a conviction. In Park, the statute under which the
corporate president was convicted did not have such a mens
rea requirement. Id. at 672. Therefore, in this case, the gov-
ernment should have been required to go even further than
the standard set out in Park. Although Barker was plant man-
ager, he did not bear a responsible share of any alleged viola-
tion by Adams. He had no knowledge of any violations. The
district court did not correctly apply this standard and found
Barker liable based solely upon his position as a corporate of-
ficer. Therefore, this court should reverse the district court's
decision.
A district court in Massachusetts faced a similar issue
and found that a magistrate had erred in basing a conclusion
of guilt on the defendant's position as a chief executive officer.
United States v. New England Grocer's Supply Co., 488
F.Supp. 230, 232 (D.Mass 1980). The court admitted to the
difficulty of applying the Park standard:
The line drawn by the Court between a conviction
based on corporate position alone and one based on a "re-
sponsible relationship" to the violation is a fine one, and
arguably no wider than a corporate bylaw. Nevertheless,
the Court clearly stated that a conviction under [FDCA]
could not be based on corporate position alone.
[Vol. 8
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss2/7
BEST APPELLANT BRIEFS
Id. at 234. The court noted the fact that the defendant in that
case was "the senior officer with ultimate authority" but
stated that this fact alone was not enough to convict without
proof beyond a reasonable doubt establishing the defendant's
responsible relationship for the violations.
In the case of Barker, the district court was required to
apply this admittedly difficult standard. The standard was not
made easier by the fact that, under RCRA, the violation must
be made "knowingly." Further, Barker's knowledge can not be
inferred from his position at Omni. Such an inference would
void the requirement that liability can not be based solely
upon a person's position in a corporation.
Bernard Barker exercised the necessary degree of care by
promptly responding to what appeared to be a routine request
for information. He instructed Adams to answer the govern-
ment's questions truthfully. Adams reported that he had told
the government he did not know the source of the spill.
Barker had no reason to doubt the truthfulness of Adams'
statements. Compare this situation to the one in Park, where
Park had been given notice of continuing violations even after
instructing his subordinate to resolve the problem. Park, 421
U.S. at 664, 665. Here, Barker was never given notice that the
government was dissatisfied with Adams' response.
In applying the proper standard, the district court should
have found that Barker did not have the knowledge necessary
for a conviction. In addition, the district court should have
found that Barker did not bear a responsible share of the vio-
lation. The district court erred in finding Barker liable based
solely upon his position as Omni's plant manager.
In its misapplication of Park, the district court created a
strict liability standard for § 3008(d)(3). Section 3008 does not
impose this kind of liability. Congress knows how to create
strict liability offenses but did not do so here. When Congress
seeks to impose strict liability, it dispenses with the language
of mens rea and it does not use terms such as "knowingly."
An elementary rule of construction is that "[a] statute should
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignifi-
cant ... ." 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.06. In
[25]
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RCRA, congress employed the term "knowingly" to describe
the requisite mental state to convict a defendant for a viola-
tion of section 3008(d)(3). This language should be given ef-
fect. Although strict liability statutes are occasionally em-
ployed to control areas of activity which are heavily regulated
for the health and welfare of society at large, See, United
States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), "[w]e start with the fa-
miliar proposition that '[t]he existence of a mens rea is the
rule, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-
American jurisprudence.'" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 500 (1951). Because the plain language of section
3008(d)(3) prescribes a mens rea requirement of "knowingly,"
this section must not be read as creating strict liability.
The district court erred in its application of the Park
standard by misinterpreting section 3008(d)(3). The drafters
of section 3008(d)(3) stated that the provision "provides for
criminal penalties for the person who knowingly" violates the
provision. H. Rep. No. 94-1491, pt. 1, 94th Cong. 2d. sess. re-
printed, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News p. 6268 at
6269, (emphasis added). Section 3008(d)(3) simply does not
impose strict criminal liability. Thus, the district court erred
in finding Barker liable based solely on his position in the
corporation.
C. In Light of Compelling Policy Arguments, the Dis-
trict Court Should Limit the Government's
Prosecutorial Discretion Under RCRA.
This case is an example of the danger inherent in al-
lowing prosecutors too much discretion. The scope of liability
urged by the government covers even the most petty, techni-
cal violations of RCRA. Under the government's suggested
standard, which amounts to strict liability, corporate officers
and employees such as Barker are subjected to sanctions dis-
proportionate to their culpability and far in excess of any po-
tential harm to society.
The judiciary needs to place some limitation on the abil-
ity of the government to prosecute corporate officials for envi-
ronmental violations. Prior to this case, the government has
[Vol. 8
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limited prosecutions to the most egregious cases where the
public health has been clearly threatened. This case marks a
departure from what were reasonable guidelines. This case in-
dicates an immediate need for the courts limit government's
prosecutorial discretion
In a Supreme Court decision that was relied upon heavily
in Park, the Court stated that the question of responsibility of
corporate officers must be entrusted to "the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges and the ultimate
judgment of juries." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 284-85 (1943). This trust is implicit in Park's broad stan-
dard of responsibility. Where the prosecutor has abused this
trust, the Supreme Court did not intend for a reviewing court
to stand idly by, helpless to provide justice. The government
abused its discretion and the district court extended the re-
sponsible corporate officer doctrine to a manifestly unjust ex-
treme. 'That this conviction is unjust is apparent given the
enormous impact of criminal sanctions when compared to the
relatively minor degree of harm caused by the alleged wrong-
doing and the lack of any resultant public benefit.
At one time, the Department of Justice relied upon spe-
cific prosecutorial guidelines in deciding whether to impose
criminal sanctions on corporate officials. A recent legal study
sets out four "key factors" prosecutors rely upon when decid-
ing whether to pursue a case: one, evidence of knowledge or
intent; two, the harm that flows from a violation; three, the
economic gain to the violator; and four, the degree to which to
violations were aggravated or repeated. Habicht, The Federal
Perspective, 17 E.L.R. at 10481. When applied to situations
where corporate officials authorize dumping hazardous waste
into a ditch, or where they authorized the disposal of hun-
dreds of drums containing hazardous waste at illegal dump-
sites, these factors are easily satisfied. Johnson & Towers, 741
F.2d at 664; Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1501.
These four factors are not satisfied in this case. Any evi-
dence of knowledge or intent to make a fraudulent statement
is nebulous at best. This is especially true given the vagueness
of EPA's request and the lack of any concrete guidelines for
responding. The harm caused by the spill was negligible, very
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little waste was spilled. The harm of the alleged violation,
false reporting, is even more attenuated. There was no intent
to mislead the EPA, in fact, Barker instructed Adams to coop-
erate in the investigation. Finally, there is no evidence of any
economic gain or that the violations were aggravated or re-
peated. If the government had followed its own guidelines, it
never would have brought this case. This court should impose
restrictions upon the government's prosecutorial discretion
and reverse the decision of the district court.
The government's abuse of discretion becomes readily ap-
parent when comparing the nature of the alleged violation to
the consequences of criminal prosecution. Section 3008(d) au-
thorizes two years imprisonment. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). Just an
indictment alone will "have a devastating personal and pro-
fessional impact." United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817
(3d Cir. 1979). Given this impact, one would expect the gov-
ernment to use criminal sanctions sparingly, punishing only
conduct the average person would consider criminal. It is diffi-
cult to imagine that the average person would find Barker's
conduct criminal.
Given the availability of civil sanctions for this alleged vi-
olation, the government should have pursued them instead of
imposing straight to criminal sanctions. United States Gyp-
sum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436. In this case, the government has
neglected its duty to prioritize cases and to pursue criminal
sanctions in the most egregious situations. In addition, before
corporate officials can be found criminally liable criminal the
conduct needs to be clearly defined so prosecution is consis-
tent and unaffected by public pressure. Because the govern-
ment's prosecution of this case is unjustified, this court should
reverse Barker's conviction.
Ultimately, the prosecutor's discretion must be informed
by the Constitution. Constitutional limitations are implicit in
any Supreme Court decision, including its statement in Dot-
terweich, that the responsibility of corporate officers must be
entrusted to "the good sense of prosecutors." 320 U.S. at 284-
85. Cases such as this strain the limits of this trust, not only
for policy reasons, but because the Constitution must be a fac-
tor in any criminal prosecution.
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The Constitution provides a right against self-incrimina-
tion. Constitutional due process forbids criminal prosecutions
based on vague and unknowable standards. These constitu-
tional rights are reflected in stringent criminal discovery rules
and the strict construction of criminal statutes. Prosecutors
should not be allowed to avoid these limitations by issuing
what appear to be civil discovery requests and using informa-
tion so obtained for criminal prosecutions. Such requests
come dangerously close to requiring the corporate employees
to incriminate themselves.
Where such requests are vague and the standards for re-
sponding are impossible to discern, due process demands that
any prosecution be limited. In this case, allowing the convic-
tion to stand permits the government to encroach on Consti-
tutionally protected rights. Bernard Barker responded
promptly and honestly to the government's request for infor-
mation. The request did not make the possibility of criminal
prosecution apparent. Further, the EPA has yet to develop
regulations defining what would constitute an adequate re-
sponse to such a request. The government abused the discre-
tion granted to it by the Supreme Court and the district court
erred by failing to limit this abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
Therefore, this should court reverse Barker's conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of New Union, denying
appellant Barker's motion for judgment of acquittal, should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Bernard Barker,
Appellant
Dated: November 28, 1990
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